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Appendix 1 to Annex "A"

Operation Plan
CINCFE No. 9-50

General Headquarters
Far East Command
Tokyo, Japan
28 September 1950

Estimate of the Enemy Situation
and
Capabilities of Defending NORTH KOREA

1. Assumption:

That the Eighth U.S. Army and X Corps juncture will effectively cut off the escape northward of approximately 35% of the NK armed forces trapped South and West of the axis - PUSAN-SEOUL.

2. Enemy Situation:

a. No organized North Korean Army unit is presently known to be located north of the 38th Parallel. Available units existing prior to 25 June plus provisional units conscripted both in China, North Korea, and South Korea have long since been utilized in the drive to PUSAN and later in desperation to save the situation in the South. Although there are no indications of the existence of NK Security Force Units north of the 38th Parallel, it is believed that a limited number of such troops are being utilized particularly along vital lines of communications. Also to be considered are cadres and trainees which might well be available from the 12 known replacement training centers. These RTC's have an estimated total capacity of 125,000 trainees who receive varying types of training including basic, infantry, AT Gunnery, mountain training and armored. However, no estimate can be made at this time as to strength available from this source.

The bulk of NK resistance to be encountered north of the 38th Parallel will be offered by retreating elements and remnants of both Security Force Units and combat units. Enemy combat forces who successfully disengage from contact with the exploiting U.N. armed forces in the South will have little or no opportunity to evacuate heavy equipment or supporting weapons with which to organize an effective defense. Security Force units now located South of the 38th Parallel and North of the Eighth U.S. Army - X Corps line will assist to a small degree in the

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defense of the Parallel; however, for the most part these forces are not effective forces and are a poor substitute for regular forces. Their primary mission as security troops is to maintain the security of lines of communications, civil control and the elimination of isolated or by-passed enemy units within newly acquired territory. Although the brigade and regiments of these Security Forces have no SP, artillery or heavy weapons units, the battalions are equipped with a TO/E of small arms, similar to the normal infantry battalion. Some of these battalions have on occasions been utilized in front lines to fill gaps and secure flanks.

To date there have been no reports or indications of overt Chinese or Russian troop participation; however, there has been substantiated evidence of CCF trained and equipped Koreans fighting with NK forces, and some unconfirmed reports of CCF and USSR units in North Korean rear areas. In this connection, attention must be brought to focus on the CCF units of the Chinese 4th Field Army who have for a considerable period been reported to be massing on the Korean-Manchurian border. CCF forces can be made available in strength up to 100,000 immediately should a decision be made to employ them in Korea.

Only sporadic enemy air attacks can be expected from the presently depleted NK Air Force. The possibility of open CCF assistance with its estimated strength of 200 combat planes must not be overlooked nor would it be advisable to give only cursory attention to the powerful USSR Air Force.

Guerrilla activity may be expected to continue on an ever decreasing scale since it is estimated that little aid from the NKPA would be forthcoming.

3. <u>Enemy Capabilities</u>:

a. Limited defense along 38th Parallel.

b. Delaying action from 38th Parallel to PYONGYANG-WONSAN line.

c. Defense along SONANJU-SUNCHON-KOWAN line.

d. Guerrilla activity in U.N. occupied areas.

e. Limited air action.

f. Reinforcement by CCF and/or USSR.

4. Discussion:

a. Limited defense along 38th Parallel: The enemy can conduct a limited defense along the 38th parallel. The western sector of this line will probably be held by elements of forces retreating from the SEOUL area. It is estimated that at least two-thirds of these forces, with small arms and some heavy equipment, should be able to extricate themselves from the SEOUL area. The remainder of the line will be manned by units escaping from the Southern front. No estimate can be made at this time as to numbers of personnel who will be salvaged from the south, however, such units so escaping will be disorganized, of low morale, lacking in heavy equipment and possibly in a major portion of their automatic weapons and anti-mechanized guns. Security Police and training units remaining in the North will probably be employed to supplement these forces.

The enemy may attempt to man positions occupied before the invasion of 25 June. Delay by U.N. forces at the 38th parallel will allow these units to recuperate, reorganize and form a more formidable defense line. A prolonged delay will allow resupply of heavy equipment and personnel reinforcements from Chinese and USSR sources.

b. Delaying action from 38th parallel to PYONGYANG-WONSAN line. Constant pressure across the 38th parallel will keep the NK Army disorganized and should prevent other than limited delaying action to the PYONGYANG-WONSAN line by defense of successive strong points on vital terrain features.

c. Defense along SONANJU-SUNCHON-KOWAN line. This line runs across the narrowest neck of the Korean peninsula. If time permits the enemy could consolidate his forces and take advantage of natural terrain barriers. Here again time and available forces are the key to the defense and cannot be accurately forecast.

d. Guerrilla activity in U.N. occupied areas. Constant UN pressure during the withdrawal can be expected to disperse NK Forces into small detached units. These isolated bands may fight as guerrillas, but their effectiveness

will gradually diminish if they are not coordinated and supplied by outside sources.

e. Limited Air Action. The enemy can conduct small scale, hit and run air raids, but these will be only of a harassing and nuisance value.

f. Reinforcement by CCF and USSR. CCF forces are presently available on the Yalu River. Reinforcements up to a strength of approximately 100,000 personnel could be made immediately available to North Korea, should they be offered for use by the Chinese Communists.

5. Conclusions:

It is estimated that the enemy can conduct a limited defense along the 38th Parallel with the equivalent of approximately 4 to 5 NK Divisions, lacking proper equipment, with poor organization, questionable leadership, and low morale. This force may be backed-up with or supplemented by 15 to 20 Security Force battalions at doubtful combat efficiency. The meager equipment in possession of Security Forces and training units would not lend materially to the defensive effort of the above mentioned divisions. The resistance offered by the NK will increase in direct proportion to the time delay imposed upon the NK forces at the 38th Parallel and the amount of materiel and personnel committed by the CCF and USSR.